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This paper investigates the ownership and control of Thai public firms in the period after the East Asian financial 
crisis, compared to those in the pre-crisis period. Using the comprehensive unique database of ownership and board 
structures, we find that the ownership and control appear to be more concentrated in the hands of controlling 
shareholders subsequent to the crisis. Interestingly, even though families remain the most prevalent owners of Thai 
firms and are still actively involved in the management after the financial crisis, their role as the controlling 
shareholder  becomes less significant. In addition, our results show that direct shareholdings are most frequently 
used as a means of control in both periods. Pyramids and cross-shareholdings, however, are employed to the lesser 
extent following the crisis.  
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Previous studies document that changes in ownership and board structures of firms in the US 
occur in response to changes in the business or industry conditions of the firms due to changes in 
regulations, input costs, technology and financial system (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Holderness 
et al., 1999; Kole and Lehn, 1999). In addition, ownership and board changes might be attributable 
to past stock-price returns, top executives changes, and corporate control threats (Denis and Sarin, 
1999).  However, little evidence on ownership structure changes following a macroeconomic shock 
or crisis has been documented.  
Although recently studies focusing on how firms respond to an economy-wide shock have 
been increasing, to our knowledge there is no study that directly investigates an impact of a 
macroeconomic shock on ownership and board structures. For example, Baek et al. (2002) focus 
only on the effects of the East Asian financial crisis on restructuring activities using data on Korean 
firms. They assume that ownership structure is predetermined, and document the negative relation 
between ownership by owner-managers and the likelihood that firms undertake downsizing activities. 
Unlike Baek et al. (2002), we investigate changes in ownership and board structures as a part of the 
restructuring process in response to the macroeconomic shock. The country of focus is Thailand, 
which was affected tremendously by the 1997 East Asian crisis.  Hence it provides a spectacular 
opportunity to explore this issue. Similar to most research on the ownership structure literature, our 
analysis is best viewed as an exploratory data study.  
Our study focuses on Thai non-financial publicly traded firms in 2000 compared to those of 
1996, which is one year before the crisis. This comparison allows us to address three principal issues. 
First, how corporate ownership structure changes as the economy, the financial system and the 
  2regulation on foreign ownership have changed. Second, whether there are any variations in 
mechanisms used by the owners to control the firms before and after the crisis. Finally, to what 
extent the degree of controlling shareholders’ participation in management changes, subsequent to 
the economic shock.  
Surprisingly, we find that the ownership and control appear to be more concentrated in the 
hands of controlling shareholders, subsequent to the crisis. Interestingly, even though families are 
still the most prevalent owners of Thai firms, their role is reduced. Similar to the pre-crisis period, 
the controlling shareholders are typically involved in management in the majority of firms. 
Especially in family-owned firms, the participation of controlling families’ members in the board is 
even greater after the crisis. In addition, our results show that direct shareholdings are the most 
common means of control used in more than two-third of the firms in both periods. Rather than 
direct ownership, pyramidal structures and cross-shareholdings are employed. These control-
enhancing mechanisms, nevertheless, are used less often, reflected in the lower degree of separation 
between ownership and control following the macroeconomic shock.   
This study is organized as followed. In Section 2, we describe data sources, data collection, 
and data definition. In Section 3, we examine who control Thai firms in the period after the crisis. 
Section 4 provides analyses of the deviation between ownership and control of the firms’ ultimate 
owners and the means they use to enhance their voting rights from associated cash-flow rights. We 
also investigate the separation between ownership and management in this Section. In Section 5, we 
explore the concentration of ownership and control in firms that have no controlling shareholder. 
Finally, our conclusion is drawn in Section 6. 
 
2. Data Construction 
2.1 Data Sources 
   Our sample includes all non-financial companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
The data of 1996 and 2000 are used to represent the pre- and post-crisis periods, respectively. The 
choices of these two years are arbitrary, however. We do not investigate banks and other financial 
companies because unlike non-financial companies, there are ownership restrictions imposed on 
banks and financial institutions by the Bank of Thailand
1. 
Our study is based on comprehensive data sources of ownership. Previous research on 
ownership structure of firms in East Asian countries (for example, Claessens et al., 2000; Lemmon 
and Lins, forthcoming; Lins, forthcoming; Mitton, 2002) typically employs data sources that include 
shareholders with shareholdings of at least 5 percent, while our database includes more detailed 
information. More precisely, our database provides the information on shareholders who hold at 
least 0.5 percent of a firm’s shares. This ownership data as well as the board data are obtained from 
the I-SIMS database produced by the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Additional information on the 
ownership and board data, such as lists of a company’s affiliates and shareholdings by these 
companies as well as family relationships among board members, is manually collected from 
company files (FM 56-1) available at the library and the website of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
Besides Johnstone et al. (2001), we also search various books written in Thai to trace family 
relationships beyond their surnames (Pornkulwat, 1996; Sappaiboon, 2000a, 2000b, and 2001). 
We use the BOL database provided by BusinessOnLine Ltd. to trace the ownership of private 
companies that appear as corporate shareholders of our sample firms. The BOL has a license from 
the Ministry of Commerce to reproduce the company information from the Ministry’s database. 
Basically, this database includes major information of all registered companies in Thailand that is 
reported annually to the Ministry.  
                                                 
1 No shareholder is allowed to own more than 5 and 10 percent of the shares of commercial banks and finance companies, 
respectively.  
  4With all the above data sources, we are able to trace the ultimate owners of all privately 
owned companies that are the (domestic corporate) shareholders of firms in our focus. As will be 
shown later, often we underestimate equity stakes held by the firm’s shareholders without searching 
for the owners of these private companies. 
 
2.2 Definition of Controlling Shareholder 
A controlling shareholder or an ultimate owner can be defined as a shareholder who directly 
or indirectly owns more than 25 percent of a company’s votes (Stock Exchange of Thailand, 1998). 
We are aware that cut-off levels of 10 percent and 20 percent are more commonly used in the 
literature (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). However, due to 
differences in law and legislation across countries, a 25 percent cut-off is more appropriate as far as 
Thailand is concerned
2. The shareholder with more than 25 percent stakes can control a firm because 
no other single shareholder would own enough voting rights to have the absolute power over the 
firm to challenge him. Under the Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535, to have absolute power 
over a firm, a shareholder needs to own at least 75 percent of a firm’s votes.  
Ironically, a shareholder with 25 percent of votes has sufficient legal rights to perform the 
following actions under the Thai corporate law. First, he has the right to ask the court to withdraw a 
resolution that fails to comply with or that is in contravention of the articles of the company’s 
association or the provisions of the Public Limited Companies Act. Second, he has the right to 
demand an inspection of the company’s business operation and financial condition. Third, he has the 
right to call an extraordinary general meeting at any time. Fourth, he has the right to request the 
court to dissolve the company if he expects that further business operation will bring in only losses 
and that the company has no chance of recovery (Sersansie and Nimmansomboon, 1996). 
                                                 
2 See also Wiwattanakantang (2000 and 2001) for the argument of this issue. 
    
2.3 Definition of Ownership and Control 
Unlike many countries in Europe, multiple voting shares do not exist in Thailand. Thai law 
prohibits the issuance of such shares. Therefore, we will focus only on the three control mechanisms, 
namely, direct, pyramidal, and cross-shareholdings, here. “Direct ownership” means that a 
shareholder owns shares under his own name or via a private company owned by him. “Indirect 
ownership” is when a company is owned via other public firms or a chain of public firms. This chain 
of controls is in the form of pyramidal structures and/or cross-shareholdings, which can include 
many layers of firms. In this case, we will outline the controlling shareholder(s) of these firms. 
Following the literature, we also calculate both cash-flow and voting rights by following the 
standard approach used in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). Regarding the 
definitions of pyramidal structures and cross-shareholdings, we use the conventional method of La 
Porta et al. (1999). Previous studies suggest that while direct shareholdings do not create 
discrepancies between voting and cash-flow rights, pyramids and cross-shareholdings do (Grossman 
and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Wolfenzon, 1998; Bebchuk et al., 1999).  
We classify “an ultimate owner” or “a controlling shareholder” into eight types as follows: 
1. “A group of related families”, which is defined as an individual, a family, and members of 
a group of families that are relatives, including in-law families. Regarding family relationship, we 
treat members of a family as a single shareholder assuming that they vote as a group. Members of a 
family include those who have the same family name, those who are close relatives, and those who 
are relatives of in-laws of a family. 
2. “The state”, which is the Thai government. 
3. “Domestic financial institution”, which is defined as a financial (and securities)company 
as well as a mutual fund that is owned by domestic investors. 
  64. “Foreign investor”, which is defined as a foreign individual, family, and corporations. 
Note here that similar to previous studies in the literature, we do not search for the ultimate owner of 
the parent companies of foreign corporate shareholders. So it might be the case that firms that have 
foreign corporations as their controlling shareholders, and hence defined as foreign-controlled firms, 
are actually widely held if their parent companies in the home based countries are dispersedly owned. 
5. “Foreign institutional investor”, which is defined as a financial (and securities), insurance 
company as well as a mutual fund that is owned by foreign investors.  
6. “A group of unrelated families”, which is defined as members of a group of families that 
are not related but jointly own a private company, which in turn ultimately controls the sample firms. 
7. “Multiple controlling shareholders”, which is defined as a firm in which the number of 
controlling shareholders is more than one. 
8. “No controlling shareholder”, which is defined as a firm that does not have an ultimate 
controlling shareholder. 
 
2.4 Comparability with Claessens et al. (2000) 
There are a number of issues that might affect the comparability of our results and those of 
Claessens et al. (2000) who investigate the ownership of East Asian firms using 1996 data. First, the 
sample firms are different. Their sample includes financial companies and banks, while ours does 
not. Furthermore, while our sample covers all non-financial listed firms, their sample covers only 
36.78 percent of all listed companies. Second, their definition of controlling shareholder differs from 
ours. Specifically, they use the 20 percent cut-off in defining the controlling shareholder, while we 
employ the 25 percent cut-off. Third, their ownership data might not be as comprehensive as ours in 
that their database provides only shareholders with stakes of at least 5 percent, while our database 
includes more detailed information of shareholders who hold at least 0.5 percent. Also, they only 
   trace the ownership within publicly traded firms. Consequently, their ownership calculation could 
give some biased results. For example, firms that were classified as widely held in their sample 
might not truly represent firms with no controlling shareholder. Perhaps these firms are classified 
into such category simply because their ownership could not be traced. 
 
3. Results: Who Control Thai Firms after the East Asian financial Crisis 
  We begin our exploration by investigating who ultimately own and control Thai listed 
companies based on 2000 data, and then compare the results with the pre-crisis structure. Table 1 
shows that the existence of controlling shareholders has been typical for Thai firms during the pre- 
and post-crisis periods. More than three quarters of our sample firms have at least one controlling 
shareholder. Specifically, in 2000, about 79.19 percent of the firms have controlling shareholders. 
Among these firms, 67.05 percent (209 firms) have a single controlling block, while 14.29 percent 
(46 firms) are ultimately owned by a group of controlling shareholders. When compared to the pre-
crisis data, the ownership appears to be slightly more concentrated.  In 1996, controlling 
shareholders exist in 78.69 percent of the sample firms. The proportion of firms in which the 
controlling shareholder exists is not statistically different between both periods. 
 
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
We compare our results with those of Claessens et al. (2000) while keeping the facts stated in 
Section 2.4 in mind. To be comparable, we extend the calculation of the ownership and control by 
using the 20 percent cut-off. Our findings show that around 10.25 and 11.65 percent of our sample 
firms have no controlling shareholder in 2000 and 1996, respectively. Claessens et al. (2000), 
  8however, document that in 1996 only 6.6 percent of Thai firms in their sample are widely held
3. The 
comparison, using either 25 percent or 20 percent cut-off level, gives the consistent results that the 
ownership happens to be marginally more concentrated in the post-crisis period. 
Changes in the ownership structure should be seen more clearly when investigating the 
percentage of firms associated with a particular type of controlling shareholders. After the crisis, 
firms that are controlled by a group of related families still appear to be the most prevalent in Thai 
stock market. However, the percentage of such firms has declined. That is, a group of related 
families controls about 45.65 percent of the firms in the sample in 2000, while such a group controls 
about 51.4 percent of the firms in 1996. The fraction of related family-controlled firms in the post-
crisis period is, nevertheless, not significantly different at the conventional levels from that in the 
pre-crisis period.  
Controlling ownership by families seems to be substituted by other types of shareholders. 
Particularly, we find that foreign ownership increases from 13.07 percent in 1996 to 15.22 percent in 
2000. Moreover, the fraction of firms owned by domestic financial institutions rises from 0.57 
percent to 1.24 percent. In addition, the fraction of firms owned by a group of controlling 
shareholders increases from 11.65 percent to 14.29 percent. The Thai government remains as the 
controlling shareholder of nine firms after the crisis, while it controls eight firms before the crisis. 
These firms account for 2.48 percent of the 2000 sample. Among firms with a group of controlling 
shareholders, the proportion of firms that are controlled by a group of unrelated families slightly 
declines from 5.97 percent in 1996 to 5.59 percent in 2000, while the proportion of firms with 
multiple controlling shareholders increases from 5.68 percent to 8.70 percent .  
Although none of the changes in the fraction of firms with each type of controlling 
shareholders between both periods is statistically significant, the decline in the fraction of related 
                                                 
3A plausible reason why Claessens et al. (2000) find smaller number of widely held firms than our calculation might be 
   family-controlled firms and the rise in the fraction of firms with multiple controlling shareholders 
have the highest t-statistics of 1.43 and 1.57, respectively. 
 
4. Ownership and Control of Controlling Shareholders 
4.1 Control Mechanisms   
We investigate how the controlling shareholder owns and controls the firms in this section. 
Table 2 shows that direct ownership is used most often in Thai public firms during the pre- and post-
crisis years. In 2000, in approximately 78.04 percent of the firms, their controlling shareholders use 
simply direct shareholdings, compared to 76.53 percent in 1996. In other words, controlling 
shareholders in more than two-third of the firms own the shares using their own names and/or 
through their private companies. Based on our comprehensive database, we find that, on average, 
35.8 and 35.5 percent of the direct shareholdings are done via companies that are privately owned in 
1996 and 2000, respectively. Hence, without tracing the ownership of these private companies, often 
we underestimate the actual cash-flow and control rights held by the controlling shareholders. 
 
TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
 
Interestingly, in almost all the firms, controlling shareholders do not use either pyramids or 
cross-shareholdings alone to control the firms. In 2000, there are only two instances of using simply 
pyramids, while there is no single case where the controlling shareholders employ cross-
shareholdings alone. The combinations of pyramids with direct shareholdings and pyramids with 
direct and cross shareholdings are more common. Specifically, in about 14.9 percent of the firms, 
                                                                                                                                                                   
that their samples exclude firms that are difficult to trace the ultimate owners  (see Section 2.4).  
  10direct shareholdings are used with pyramids, and in about 6.27 percent of the firms, direct 
shareholdings are used with pyramids and cross-shareholdings. 
The combination of direct shareholdings with pyramids and cross-shareholdings is used most 
often in firms controlled by a group of related families. Statistically, out of 38 firms that use direct 
shareholdings-cum-pyramids, 21 firms belong to a group of related families, seven firms are 
multiple controlling shareholders-owned, six firms are foreign-owned, three firms belong to a group 
of unrelated families, and the rest one firm is state-owned. A similar picture emerges regarding the 
use of direct shareholdings-cum-pyramids-cum-cross-shareholdings. 
Interestingly, compared to the pre-crisis period, the exercise of pyramidal structures slightly 
decreases. Overall, our results show that pyramids are used in 21.96 and 23.47 percent of the firms 
with controlling shareholders in 2000 and 1996, respectively. 
Compared to other countries in East Asia (Claessens et al., 2000) and more developed 
economies (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002)
4, pyramids are less commonly used in 
Thailand. Pyramids are employed in about 38.17 percent of companies in East Asia (Claessens et al., 
2000) and 26 percent of firms in the 27 wealthiest countries (La Porta et al., 1999). Thai firms 
appear to use pyramids slightly more frequently when compared to firms in Western European 
countries, however. Faccio and Lang (2002) reveal that pyramids are found in approximately 19.13 
percent of the European firms in their sample. 
Consistent with findings from other countries, cross-shareholdings happen to be used much 
less often by the controlling shareholders of Thai firms. In 2000, only about 6.27 percent of the firms 
with controlling shareholders (16 firms) employ cross-shareholdings, being most prevalent in firms 
                                                 
4 La Porta et al. (1999) use the data of 20 largest firms in the 27 wealthiest countries in 1995. Faccio and Lang (2002) use 
the data of 5,232 publicly traded companies in 13 Western European countries for the period between 1996 and 1999. 
Both studies include shareholder with at least 5 percent of the firms’ shares and employ the 20 percent cut-off to define 
the controlling shareholders. 
   controlled by a group of related families. Specifically, out of these 16 firms, 12 companies
5 are 
owned by a group of related families, accounting for 8.39 percent of all related family-controlled 
firms. Cross-shareholdings also appear in firms that are controlled by domestic financial institutions 
(two firms) and a group of unrelated families (two firms). 
The proportion of firms using cross-shareholding structures marginally decreases from that 
of the pre-crisis period. In 1996, there exist 20 firms, accounting for 7.22 percent of all firms with 
controlling shareholders, in which cross-shareholdings are employed. Again, cross-shareholdings 
appear most in the firms controlled by a group of related families (16 firms). 
  When compared with more developed countries, the proportion of Thai firms exercising 
cross-shareholdings is relatively more prevalent. Cross-shareholdings are used in about 3.15 percent 
of the sample firms in La Porta et al. (1999) and 6.25 percent of the Western European firms in 
Faccio and Lang (2002). 
  When compared with those in other East Asian economies, controlling shareholders in 
Thailand, however, employ cross-shareholdings in the lesser degree. In particular, Claessens et al. 
(2000) document that in 1996, approximately 10.1 percent of firms in nine East Asian countries use 
cross-shareholdings. Regarding Thailand, they find that only 0.8 percent of Thai firms in their 
sample use cross-shareholdings, which are the least prevalent among all East Asian firms. We 
suspect, however, that their results might be underestimated since their sample coverage is small. 
More precisely, 232 firms are excluded probably because these firms are controlled by private 
companies in which ultimate owners are difficult to identify (see Claessens et al., 2000, p. 88). In 
fact, we find that pyramids and cross-shareholdings are often used in this type of firms. 
 
                                                 
5 Among these 12 companies, nine companies belong to a single family, Chokwatana, who is one of the biggest business 
groups. 
  124.2 Ownership Concentration  
  In this section, we investigate ownership concentration in the hands of controlling 
shareholders, measured by cash-flow and voting rights. The results are shown in Panel A and B of 
Table 3. In 2000, a controlling shareholder owns, on average, 45.27 percent of the firm’s cash-flow 
rights, and 48.18 percent of the firm’s voting rights, with the median values of 44.41 percent and 
46.99 percent, respectively. The cash-flow rights held by controlling shareholders range from 12.38 
percent to 92.85 percent, while their voting rights range from 25.03 percent to 92.85 percent.  
 
TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
 
Among all types of firms with controlling shareholders, the Thai government  holds the 
highest mean value of cash-flow rights (52.71 percent), followed by the controlling shareholders in 
firms that are owned by related families (47.11 percent), unrelated families (46.47 percent), foreign 
investors (46.02 percent), and foreign institutional investors (43.03 percent). In firms controlled by 
domestic financial institutions and  firms with multiple controlling shareholders
6, the controlling 
shareholders hold the lowest average cash-flow rights of 34.2 percent and 36.09 percent, respectively.  
Regarding the control, the most concentrated voting rights appear in firms owned by the Thai 
government of 52.83 percent. The mean values of voting rights held by controlling shareholders in 
firms owned by related families (50.41 percent), unrelated families (48.05 percent), foreign investors 
(47.31 percent), and foreign institutional investors (43.03 percent) are also relatively high. The 
lowest mean values of controlling shareholders’ voting rights are shown in firms owned by domestic 
financial institutions (40.3 percent) and firms with multiple controlling shareholders (40.13 percent). 
                                                 
6 Note that cash-flow and voting rights in firms owned by multiple controlling shareholders are the rights held by the 
largest controlling shareholder. 
 
   Compared to the results of the pre-crisis period, the concentration of ownership and control 
in the hands of controlling shareholders slightly increases. Specifically, the average cash-flow rights 
(voting rights) held by controlling shareholders rise from 44.66 percent (47.75 percent) in 1996, to 
45.27 percent (48.18 percent) in 2000. The median value of cash-flow rights increases from 44.1 
percent to 44.41 percent, while  the median value of voting rights declines from 47.75 percent to 
46.99 percent. 
Except the Thai government, cash-flow and voting rights of all groups of controlling 
shareholders increase after the crisis. Specifically, in firms owned by a group of related families, the 
controlling families hold, on average, 46 percent of the firms’ cash-flow rights in 1996, compared to 
47.11 percent in 2000. The mean value of cash-flow rights owned by the controlling shareholders in 
firms owned by domestic financial institutions rises from 27.26 percent in 1996 to 34.2 percent in 
2000. The average cash-flow rights held by controlling foreign investors also increase from 42.85 
percent to 44.77 percent.  
Ownership concentration in firms controlled by a group of controlling shareholders is also 
higher. More precisely, a group of unrelated controlling families holds, on average, 43.75 percent of 
the firm’s cash-flow rights in 1996, relative to 47.16 percent in 2000. Likewise, in firms owned by 
multiple controlling blocks, the mean value of cash-flow rights held by the controlling shareholders 
rises from 35.41 percent to 36.63 percent. 
In contrast, the Thai government holds less cash-flow rights in 2000 than in 1996. 
Specifically, the average cash-flow rights held by the Thai government decline from 54.68 percent to 
52.71 percent .  
Regarding voting rights, we find that the controlling shareholders of firms that are owned by 
families (both related and unrelated), domestic financial institutions, and foreign investors have 
  14greater control after the crisis. The Thai government and multiple controlling blocks, however, hold 
less voting rights in 2000, relative to those in 1996. 
Even if there are changes in the controlling shareholder’s cash-flow and voting rights 
following the crisis, our results show that the mean and median values of these two rights in the 
hands of all types of controlling shareholders are not significantly different between the two periods. 
In Panel C, the results support our findings in Section 4.1. As direct shareholdings are the 
most commonly used means of control, the deviation of control from ownership is small. Overall, 
the average ratio of cash-flow to voting rights is 0.939, meaning that a controlling shareholder holds 
100 ultimate votes for each 93.9 direct shares owned. The median value of the ratio is one, however. 
This is relatively high when compared to the average ratio of firms in nine East Asian countries 
(0.746) documented in Claessens et al. (2000) and that of firms in 13 Western European countries 
(0.868) documented in Faccio and Lang (2002).  
The largest separation between ownership and control occurs in firms that are controlled by 
domestic financial institutions (0.843). In contrast, firms controlled by the State and foreign 
institutional investors show almost no separation. In the middle of these two extreme cases are firms 
that are controlled by multiple controlling blocks (0.919), a group of related families (0.926), , 
foreign investors (0.967), and a group of unrelated families (0.97). 
The degree of the separation between ownership and control appears to be slightly lower 
after the crisis. Specifically, the mean ratio of cash-flow to voting rights held by controlling 
shareholders is 0.931 in 1996 and 0.939 in 2000. The median values of the ratio for both periods are 
one, however. Among all types of firms with controlling shareholders, firms owned by a group of 
controlling shareholders have the greatest change in the mean ratio of cash-flow to voting rights. To 
be specific, the mean ratio increases from 0.938 in 1996 to 0.97 in 2000 in firms controlled by a 
group of unrelated families, and from 0.871 to 0.919 in firms with multiple controlling shareholders. 
   To a lesser extent, in foreign-owned firms, the mean ratio increases from 0.955 to 0.967. There are, 
however, no changes in the ratio of cash-flow to voting rights in related family-owned and state-
owned firms during the two periods. 
Following Claessens et al. (2002), we also calculate the difference between voting and cash-
flow rights, by deducting the controlling shareholders’ cash-flow rights from the voting rights they 
hold. The outcome reported in Panel D is consistent with the results in Panel C. 
However, similar to changes in the controlling shareholder’s cash-flow and voting rights, we 
do not find any significant changes in the ratio of cash-flow to voting rights as well as the difference 
between these two rights in all types of controlling shareholders, during the pre- and post-crisis 
periods.    
 
4.3 Controlling Shareholders’ Involvement in Management 
We investigate how often the controlling shareholders and their family members are involved 
in management in this section. We categorize management into two groups: Executive and non-
executive directors. An executive director is a person who holds one of the following positions: 
Honorary chairman, chairman, executive chairman, vice chairman, president, vice president, chief 
executive officer, managing director, deputy managing director, and assistant managing director. A 
non-executive director is a board member who does not hold an executive position. 
Consistent with the previous literature, our results in Panel A of Table 4 show that 
controlling shareholders in about two-third of the firms are involved in management.  Specifically, in 
about 67.84 percent and 60.78 percent of the firms with controlling shareholders in 2000, there is at 
least one member of the controlling family sitting in the board at top executive and non-executive 
levels, respectively.  
 
  16TABLE 4 NEAR HERE 
 
As expected, the controlling shareholders’ participation in the board is most prevalent in 
firms controlled by families, including related and unrelated families. Statistically, the incidence of 
controlling families holding top executive positions occurs in 85.71 percent and 88.89 percent of the 
firms that are controlled by related families and unrelated families respectively. Similar picture 
emerges regarding the controlling shareholders’ participation in non-executive positions. 
Specifically, this incidence appears in 76.19 percent and 94.44 percent of the firms controlled by 
related families and unrelated families, respectively. 
Controlling shareholders in the firms with multiple controlling blocks are also highly 
involved in management. In 75 percent and 67.86 percent of such firms, their controlling 
shareholders sit in the executive and non-executive boards, respectively.   
To a lesser degree, controlling shareholders in foreign-owned firms serve as executive and 
non-executive directors. This incidence is found in about 21.28 percent and 14.89 percent of these 
firms. Board representation by the controlling shareholders does not occur in the firms that are 
owned by foreign institutional investors, however.  
Compared to the pre-crisis results, the controlling shareholders’ involvement in management 
as executives slightly decreases from 68.95 percent in 1996 to 67.84 percent in 2000. The declining 
in the board representation by controlling shareholders is more pronounced at the non-executive 
level. The proportion of firms where controlling shareholders and their family members serve as 
non-executive directors declines from 65.7 percent in 1996 to 60.78 percent in 2000. However, in 
overall the incidence that controlling shareholders participate as both executive and non-executive 
directors does not differ significantly between these two periods. 
   Regarding each type of controlling shareholders, we find the interesting results that the 
proportion of firms where controlling shareholders serve as executives increases after the crisis in 
firms that are owned by families, namely a group of related and unrelated families. In related family-
controlled firms, this proportion increases from 84.44 percent in 1996 to 85.71 percent in 2000, 
while in unrelated family-controlled firms the proportion increases from 66.67 percent to 88.89 
percent. The percentage of firms with the controlling shareholders’ involvement as top managers is 
also greater in firms owned by multiple controlling blocks, from 70 percent in 1996 to 75 percent in 
2000. The fraction, however, is lower, from 23.91 percent to 21.28 percent, in foreign-owned firms. 
Regarding the controlling shareholders’ involvement in the board as non-executive directors, 
it turns out that controlling shareholders in all types of firms hold fewer board positions after the 
crisis. 
We further investigate the controlling shareholders’ involvement in management by 
controlling the board size effect. Panel B shows the ratio of board positions held by controlling 
shareholders divided by board size. The results reveal that controlling shareholders occupy about 
one-third of the firms’ boards. The average ratios are 0.33 in both periods, while the median ratio is 
0.29 in 1996 and 0.3 in 2000. 
Consistent with the previous findings, the board representation by controlling shareholders is 
remarkably high in firms that are owned by families, and low in firms that are owned by foreign 
investors. To be specific, in related family-owned firms, the average ratio of board positions held by 
the controlling family to board size is 0.43, with the median value of 0.4. Similarly, in firms owned 
by a group of unrelated families, members of the families hold the mean ratio of 0.5, with the 
median value of 0.48. On the contrary, in foreign-owned firms, the average ratio of board position 
served by controlling shareholders to the total number of board positions is only 0.09, with the 
median value of zero.  
  18When compared to the pre-crisis results, in firms owned by families, both related and 
unrelated, the controlling families’ members hold a higher fraction of board positions. In contrast, in 
firms owned by multiple controlling blocks, the controlling shareholders have fewer positions in the 
board. The ratio of board positions held by any type of controlling shareholders to board size does 
not differ significantly in the periods before and after the crisis, although the differences in the mean 
and median values of this ratio are most pronounced in firms owned by unrelated families with the t-
statistics of –1.65 and z-statistics of -1.63, respectively.   
 
4.4 Managerial Ownership: The Case of Non-Controlling Shareholders 
In this section, we analyze the ownership by executive and non-executive directors who are 
not the firm’s controlling shareholders and the members of the controlling families. Table 5 shows 
that overall management that is not from the controlling shareholders or their families almost holds 
no shares. The median shareholdings of both groups of these directors are zero percent in both pre- 
and post-crisis periods. The average shareholdings of the executives, however, are 2.26 percent in 
1996 and 2.54 percent in 2000. As for non-executives, their shareholdings are, on average, 3.18 
percent in 1996 and 3.85 percent in 2000. There are no significant differences in the shareholdings of 
these directors between both periods, however.  
    
TABLE 5 NEAR HERE 
 
In the post-crisis period, the top executives in firms owned by a group of unrelated families 
have the highest average shareholdings of 4.08 percent with the median value of 1.99 percent, while 
the non-executive directors in firms owned by foreign institutional investors hold the greatest mean 
and median values of the shareholdings of 17.43 percent. In the pre-crisis year, however, the 
   executives in foreign-controlled firms own more shares than those in other types of firms. Their 
average shareholdings are 3.3 percent, with the median value of zero percent. The non-executives in 
firms owned by domestic institutions hold the highest mean and median values of equity stakes of 
11.29 percent. As one might expect, directors in firms that are controlled by multiple controlling 
blocks and by a group of related families hold the lowest shares in both periods.    
    
5. Ownership Structure in Firms with no Controlling Shareholder 
In this Section, we investigate the ownership of the firms that are defined as firms with no 
controlling shareholder. These firms account for 20.81 percent and 21.31 percent in our 1996 and 
2000 samples, respectively. We examine whether such firms are really dispersedly owned, as 
described in the model of the UK and the US.  
Panel A of Table 6 presents the cash-flow and voting rights held by the largest shareholder of 
these firms. The results show that the ownership of these firms is quite concentrated in both periods. 
In 2000, the largest shareholder holds, on average, 16.74 percent of the firm’s cash-flow rights with 
the median value of 16.49 percent. The average voting rights held by this largest shareholder is 
18.16 percent with the median value of 19.51 percent. The maximum level of both rights is 25 
percent, and the minimum is 5.57 percent. When compared with the pre-crisis results, the mean 
value of cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholder slightly increases from 16.38 percent in 
1996 to 16.74 percent in 2000, while the mean values of voting rights are the same in these two 
periods.  
 
TABLE 6 NEAR HERE 
 
  20Panel B provides further information on the distribution of the ownership and control. In 
2000, in 37.31 percent (25 firms) of all firms with no controlling shareholder, the largest shareholder 
has between 20 percent and 25 percent of cash-flow rights. Regarding the voting rights, in 29 firms 
(43.28 percent), the largest shareholder owns the range of 20 percent to 25 percent. So, if we relax 
the definition of controlling shareholdings from those with the voting rights of 25 percent to 20 
percent, which is the threshold commonly used in the literature, then these 29 firms would be 
classified as firms with the controlling shareholder. This issue is also addressed in Section 3. 
Interestingly, if we use the cut-off level of 10 percent
7, another commonly used threshold to 
define controlling shareholding, only seven firms in 1996 and six firms in 2000 can be classified as 
having no controlling shareholder or widely held. These firms account for only about 2 percent of 
the overall samples. These findings are consistent with those documented in Claessens et al. (2000) 
for the pre-crisis period. They find that 2.2 percent of Thai firms in their sample are widely held at 
the 10 percent cut-off.  
If we lower the cut-off level further to 5 percent, then there would be no firm that can be 
classified as widely held in both periods.  
Viewed collectively, our results show that, only a small fraction of firms in our sample can 
be considered as dispersedly held by atomistic shareholders in the same way as described in the US 
and UK model. In other words, the ownership of Thai publicly traded companies is very 
concentrated. 
We also investigate the degree of discrepancy between ownership and control in these firms. 
The mean value of the ratio of cash-flow to voting rights is 0.93, with the median value of 1, 
suggesting that the control-enhancing means such as pyramiding and cross-shareholding are not 
                                                 
7 In fact, at this level of ownership, a shareholder is defined as a major shareholder. According to the Thai corporate law, 
he has the right to ask the court for the company’s dissolution and to demand the company to claim compensation from 
any misbehaved managers.  
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commonly used. This is similar to the case of firms with controlling shareholders documented in 
Section 4. In fact, our evidence reveals that the largest shareholder in 11 firms employs pyramidal 
structures, and in one firm uses cross-shareholdings. After the crisis, the degree of separation 
between ownership and control held by the largest shareholder is reduced, as measured by an 
increase in the ratio of cash-flow to voting rights from 0.91 in 1996 to 0.93 in 2000. The degree of 
separation is, however, not significantly different between the pre- and post-crisis periods.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study documents the corporate ownership and board structures after the East Asian 
financial crisis. We compare the structure with those before the crisis to address the effects of an 
economic downturn on the ownership and board structures. The results reveal that the post-crisis 
ownership structure indicates a decline of the role of families in controlling publicly traded firms. 
The controlling families are replaced mainly by foreign investors and domestic financial institutions. 
We also find the greater fraction of firms controlled by multiple controlling shareholders after the 
crisis.  
Controlling shareholders appear to use less complicated shareholdings, in the forms of 
pyramidal structures and cross-shareholdings, to enhance their control after the crisis. This is 
reflected in the lower deviation of control from ownership, as computed by the ratio of cash-flow to 
voting rights held by controlling shareholders, and by the simple difference between the two rights. 
Interestingly, we find that overall, the ownership and control in the hands of controlling shareholders 
become more concentrated subsequent to the crisis.  
The degree of separation between ownership and management, measured by the incidence 
that controlling shareholders participate in the board, is not significantly different during the pre- and    
post- crisis periods. Nevertheless, families appear to participate more, while foreign investors seem 
to be involved less often in management.  
Viewed collectively, although we do not find any statistically significant differences in the 
ownership and board structure of Thai publicly traded corporations between the pre- and post-crisis 
periods, it might still be hard to deny that the macroeconomic shock has no effect on the firms. The 
related issue on what factors determine the ownership and board changes after the crisis, however, is 
left for future research.     24
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Table 1 Identification of Controlling Shareholders 
 
This table presents the identification of controlling shareholders. Our sample includes non-financial 
companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1996 and 2000. Firms are classified into each 
category according to their controlling shareholders. In Panel A and B present the results when the 
ownership cut-off levels are 25 percent and 20 percent, respectively. Companies without a 
controlling shareholder are classified as companies with no controlling shareholder. The ‘difference’ 
column in Panel A reports the difference in the percentage of firms in each category between the two 
periods. 
 
Panel A The 25 percent ownership cut-off 
 
 2000  1996 
Type of controlling shareholder  No. of firms  %  No. of firms  % 
      
1. Firms with controlling shareholders  255 79.19 277 78.69 
1.1 With one controlling shareholder  209  64.91  236  67.05 
  1.1.1 A group of related families  147  45.65  180  51.14 
  1.1.2 State  9  2.80  8  2.27 
  1.1.3 Domestic financial  institution  4 1.24 2 0.57 
  1.1.4 Foreign investor  47  14.60  46  13.07 
  1.1.5 Foreign institutional  investor  2 0.62 0 0.00 
1.2 With a group of controlling shareholders 46 14.29 41 11.65 
  1.2.1 A group of unrelated families  18  5.59  21  5.97 
  1.2.1 Multiple controlling shareholders  28  8.70  20  5.68 
      
2. Firms with no controlling shareholder  67 20.81 75 21.31 
      
Total  322 100.00 352 100.00 
Panel B The 20 percent ownership cut-off 
 2000  1996 
Type of controlling shareholder  No. of firms  %  No. of firms  % 
      
1. Firms with controlling shareholders  289 89.75 311 88.35 
1.1 With one controlling shareholder  212  65.84  242  68.75 
  1.1.1 A group of related families  151  46.89  192  54.55 
  1.1.2 State  9  2.80  6  1.70 
  1.1.3 Domestic financial  institution  5 1.55 1 0.28 
  1.1.4 Foreign investor  45  13.98  43  12.22 
  1.1.5 Foreign institutional  investor  2 0.62 0 0.00 
1.2 With a group of controlling shareholders 77 23.91 69 19.60 
  1.2.1 A group of unrelated families  22  6.83  22  6.25 
  1.2.1 Multiple controlling shareholders  55  17.08  47  13.35 
      
2. Firms with no controlling shareholder  33 10.25 41 11.65 
      
Total  322 100.00 352 100.00 
 Table 2 Control Mechanisms 
 
This table presents how firms are owned or how controlling shareholders exercise their control over the firms. Firms are classified into 
each category according to their controlling shareholders. A controlling shareholder is a shareholder who directly or indirectly owns more 
than 25 percent of the firm's voting rights. Direct ownership is when a controlling shareholder controls a firm directly under his name, or 
via his privately owned companies. Pyramid is when a firm is controlled via other public firms. Cross-shareholding is when there is an 
incidence of cross-shares between firms that are ultimately controlled by the same controlling shareholders. The percentage column is 
calculated as the proportion of firms that fall into each category divided by the total number of firms in such category of controlling 
shareholders. 
 
   Direct (1)  Pyramid (2)  (1) and (2) 
(1), (2), and cross-
shareholding 
2000  1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000 1996

















One  controlling  shareholder                    
                 
                      
                    
                  
  A group of related families 
 
112 78.32 136  76.84 2  1.40 6  3.39  21  14.69 22  12.43 12  8.39 16  9.04
    State 8 88.89 8 100.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 11.11 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
  Domestic financial institution  2  50.00 1  50.00 0  0.00 0  0.00  0  0.00 1  50.00 2  50.00 0  0.00
  Foreign investor  41  89.13 39  90.70 0  0.00 1  2.33  6  13.04 5  11.63 0  0.00 1  2.33
  Foreign institutional investor  2  100.00 -  -  0  0.00 -  -  0  0.00 -  -  0  0.00 -  - 
Group  of  controlling  shareholders
  A group of unrelated families  13  72.22 16  80.00 0  0.00 1  5.00  3  16.67 1  5.00 2  11.11 3  15.00
  Multiple controlling shareholders 
 



































           
                      
 
  28Table 3 Ownership and Control Held by Controlling Shareholders 
 
This table presents cash-flow and control rights held by the controlling shareholders, and the 
separation between these two rights. A controlling shareholder is a shareholder who directly or 
indirectly owns more than 25 percent of the firm's voting rights. Cash-flow rights represent the 
ownership stake held by the firm’s controlling shareholders. Control rights represent the percentage 
of voting rights held by the firm’s controlling shareholders. The cash-flow and control rights of firms 
with multiple controlling shareholders are the rights held by the largest controlling shareholder. The 
‘difference’ columns report two-tailed t-tests of equal means and Wilcoxon z-tests of equal medians 
for each variable between the two periods. 
 
Panel A Cash-Flow Rights Held by Controlling Shareholders (%) 
 










One controlling shareholder            
  A group of related families  147  47.11 47.63  180  46.00  47.07  -0.589 -0.540
  State  9  52.71 49.00  8  54.68  46.12  0.183 0.000
  Domestic financial institution  4  34.20 29.11  2  27.36  27.36  -0.512 0.000
  Foreign investor  47  44.77 44.41  46  42.85  42.11  -0.636 -0.603
  Foreign institutional investor  2  43.03 43.03  0  -  -  - - 
Group  of  controlling  shareholders           
  A group of unrelated families  18  47.16 47.98  21  43.75  42.52  -0.794 -0.866
  Multiple controlling shareholders  28  36.63 38.73  20  35.41  35.58  -0.429 -0.439




















Panel B Control Rights Held by Controlling Shareholders (%) 
 
 2000  1996  Difference 
Firms with 
No. of 
firms  Mean Median
No. of 





One controlling shareholder            
  A group of related families  147  50.41 49.54  180  49.47  49.65  -0.704 -0.576
  State  9  52.83 49.00  8  54.68  46.12  0.172 0.000
  Domestic financial institution  4  40.30 38.87  2  30.92  30.92  -0.781 -0.463
  Foreign investor  47  46.05 44.70  46  44.76  44.85  -0.468 -0.292
  Foreign institutional investor  2  43.03 43.03  0  -  -  - - 
Group  of  controlling  shareholders           
  A group of unrelated families  18  48.05 49.16  21  46.46  46.41  -0.346 -0.338
  Multiple controlling shareholders  28  40.13 40.34  20  40.41  39.80  0.143 0.052
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Panel C Ratio of Cash-Flow Rights to Control Rights Held by Controlling Shareholders 
 










One controlling shareholder            
  A group of related families  147 0.926 1.000  180 0.927  1.000  0.103 0.424
  State  9  0.998 1.000  8  1.000  1.000  0.934 0.943
  Domestic financial institution  4 0.843 0.843  2 0.873  0.873  0.189 0.492
  Foreign investor  47  0.967 1.000  46  0.955  1.000  -0.484 -0.363
  Foreign institutional investor  2  1.000 1.000  0  -  -  - - 
Group  of  controlling  shareholders           
  A group of unrelated families  18  0.970 1.000  21  0.938  1.000  -1.394 -0.925
  Multiple controlling shareholders  28 0.919 1.000  20 0.871  1.000  -0.865 -1.363
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Table 4 Controlling Shareholders as Managers 
 
This table shows the degree of involvement in the management by the controlling shareholders. A 
controlling shareholder is a shareholder who directly or indirectly owns more than 25 percent of the 
firm's voting rights. Panel A shows the number of firms where the controlling shareholders are 
executive and non-executive directors. An executive director is a person who holds one of the 
following positions: honorary chairman, chairman, chairman of the management committee, 
executive chairman, vice chairman, deputy chairman, chairman of executive director, president, vice 
president, chief executive officer, managing director, deputy managing director, assistant managing 
director. A non-executive director is a person who is not an executive director or an independent 
director, but is a member of the board of directors. Figures in the percentage columns are calculated 
as the proportion of firms that fall into each category divided by the total number of firms in such 
category of controlling shareholders. The ‘difference’ columns in Panel B and C report two-tailed t-
tests of equal means and Wilcoxon z-tests of equal medians for each variable between the two 
periods. 
 
Panel A Controlling Shareholders as Executive and Non-Executive Directors 
 
  As executive directors  As non-executive directors 
  2000 1996 2000 1996 
 

















One  controlling  shareholder          
  A group of related families  126  85.71 152  84.44 112  76.19  138  76.67
    State  0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
  Domestic financial institution  0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
  Foreign investor  10  21.28 11  23.91 7  14.89  9  19.57
  Foreign institutional investor  0  0.00 -  -  0  0.00  -  - 
Group of controlling shareholders          
  A group of unrelated families  16 88.89 14 66.67 17 94.44 20 95.24
  Multiple controlling shareholders  21 75.00 14 70.00 19 67.86 15 75.00
          
All firms with controlling 
shareholders 
 
173 67.84 191 68.95 155 60.78 182 65.70
    
Panel B Ratio of Board Positions Held by Controlling Shareholders to Total Number of Board 
Positions 
 
2000 1996  Difference 






















              
A group of related families  136  92.52 0.43 0.40  168  93.33 0.40  0.36  0.101 -0.044
State  0 0.00 -  -  0 0.00 -  -  -  - 
Domestic financial institution  0  0.00 -  -  0  0.00 -  -  -  - 
Foreign  investor  13 27.66 0.09 0.00  15 32.61 0.09  0.00  0.226 0.543
Foreign institutional investor  0  0.00 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
A group of unrelated families  18  100.00 0.50 0.48  21  100.00 0.37  0.29  -1.651 -1.630
Multiple controlling 
shareholders 
25 89.29 0.27 0.22  19 95.00 0.32  0.31  0.997 0.764
                
All firms with controlling 
shareholders 
192 75.29 0.33 0.30  223 80.51 0.33 0.29 0.943 0.932
 
 Table 5 Ownership by Board Members: Non-Controlling Shareholders 
 
This table provides the ownership held by the directors who are not from the firm’s controlling shareholders. Ownership here is measured 
by an aggregate percentage of cash-flow rights held by the board members. A controlling shareholder is a shareholder who directly or 
indirectly owns more than 25 percent of the firm's voting rights. Firms are classified into each category according to their controlling 
shareholders. Figures in the percentage columns are calculated as the proportion of firms that fall into each category divided by the total 
number of firms in such category of controlling shareholders. The ‘difference’ columns report two-tailed t-tests of equal means and 
Wilcoxon z-tests of equal medians for each variable between the two periods. 
 
Panel A Ownership by Executive Directors Who Are Not Controlling Shareholders (%) 
 
2000      1996 Difference
 





















                
A group of related families 
 
100  68.03  2.40  0.00  128  71.11  2.22  0.00  -0.368 0.332 
State 9               
         
                 
                 
                 
100.00 0.00 0.00 8 100.00 0.00 0.00 - -
Domestic financial institution 
 
4  100.00 4.60 3.72 2 100.00 0.00 0.00 -1.115 -1.095
Foreign  investor 42 89.36 3.43 0.00 39 84.78 3.30 0.00 -0.123 0.050
Foreign institutional investor  2  100.00 0.00  0.00  0  0.00  -  -  -  - 
A group of unrelated families  13  72.22  4.08  1.99  19  90.48  2.51  0.00  -0.956 -1.542
Multiple controlling shareholders  22  78.57 1.11 0.00 17 85.00 1.60 0.00 0.454 0.211
                          
All firms with controlling shareholders 
 
192 75.29 2.54 0.00 213 76.90 2.26 0.00 -0.484 0.210
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A group of related families 
 
135  91.84  3.52  0.00  167  92.78  3.45  0.00  -0.265 0.524 
State 9               
             
               
               
                 
100.00 1.44 0.00 8 100.00 2.88 0.00 0.612 0.579
Domestic financial institution 
 
4  100.00 8.39 8.31 2 100.00 11.29 11.29 0.330 0.235
Foreign  investor 45 95.74 5.42 0.00 44 95.65 3.80 0.00 -0.852 -0.378
Foreign institutional investor  2  100.00 17.43  17.43  0  0.00  -  -  -  - 
A group of unrelated families  16  88.89  4.17  1.40  20  95.24  1.77  0.00  -1.520 -1.542
Multiple controlling shareholders  27  96.43 0.98 0.00 19 95.00 0.46 0.00 -0.730 0.113
                          
All firms with controlling shareholders 
 
238 93.33 3.85 0.00 260 93.86 3.18 0.00 -1.115 0.022
  
Table 6 Ownership by Largest Shareholder: Firms with no Controlling Shareholder 
 
This table shows the cash-flow and control rights by the largest shareholder of firms that have no 
controlling shareholder. The numbers of such firms are 75 in 1996, and 67 in 2000. A controlling 
shareholder is a shareholder who directly or indirectly owns more than 25 percent of the firm's 
voting rights. The ‘difference’ columns in Panel A report two-tailed t-tests of equal means and 
Wilcoxon z-tests of equal medians for each variable between the two periods. Figures in the 
percentage columns in Panel B are calculated as the proportion of firms that fall into each category 
divided by the total number of firms that have no controlling shareholders. 
 
Panel A Summary Statistics of Cash-Flow and Control Rights Held by Largest Shareholder (%) 
 
 2000  1996  Difference 
  Mean Median Mean Median  t-stat. z-stat. 
 




























Panel B The Distribution of Cash-Flow and Control Rights Held by Largest Shareholder 
 
   Cash-flow rights  Control rights 











0-5%  0 0.00 1 1.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 
5-10%  10  14.93 9 12.00 6  8.96  7  9.33 
10-15%  13 19.40 20 26.67  8  11.94 13 17.33 
15-20%  19 28.36 21 28.00 24 35.82 21 28.00 
20-25%  25 37.31 24 32.00 29 43.28 34 45.33 
Total 
 
67 100.00 75 100.00 67 100.00 75 100.00
 
 
 